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 Jerome Marshall is currently pursuing a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the District Court.  Marshall is 
represented by counsel, but he filed a motion to remove 
counsel and to proceed pro se.  He later filed a notice of 
appeal challenging the District Court’s purported denial of 
that motion.  The District Court, however, had not yet entered 
or announced any decision on that motion.  To the contrary, 
the District Court had expressly advised Marshall that it had 
not made a decision and would do so only later.  Thus, when 
Marshall filed his notice of appeal, the District Court had not 
yet entered or announced any decision that could be brought 
before us for appellate review.  The District Court later 
denied Marshall’s motion.   
 The question presented by these circumstances is 
whether Marshall’s notice of appeal has ripened now that the 
District Court has issued its decision.  We conclude that it has 
not.  Consequently, we will dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
I. Background 
 Marshall was sentenced to death in Pennsylvania in 
1984, and he has been pursuing a federal habeas petition since 
2003.  Marshall initially filed his petition through the Federal 
Community Defender.  Many years later, however, Marshall 
became dissatisfied with the Community Defender’s services 
and filed a motion for appointment of new counsel.  The 
District Court granted that motion and appointed Christian 
Hoey and Maureen Coggins to represent Marshall. 
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 Marshall soon became dissatisfied with their services 
as well, apparently because they would not withdraw the 
habeas petition filed by the Community Defender and assert 
different claims.  Marshall eventually filed pro se a document 
titled “Petitioner’s Pro Se Omnibus Motion.”  (ECF No. 102.)  
In that document, Marshall requested an order: (1) removing 
his new counsel; (2) striking the habeas petition and all other 
documents filed by the Community Defender; (3) allowing 
the filing of a new habeas petition “nunc pro tunc”; and (4) 
remanding for a new hearing “nunc pro tunc” in state court.  
It appears that Marshall sought to proceed pro se in order to 
dismiss all of his counseled claims and assert different claims 
that may be both procedurally defaulted and untimely (though 
we express no opinion on that issue). 
 By order entered April 1, 2015, the District Court 
scheduled a hearing on Marshall’s request to remove counsel 
but dismissed Marshall’s last three requests without prejudice 
because he remained represented by counsel at the time.  
(ECF No. 101.)  Shortly thereafter, counsel filed a motion 
seeking a determination of Marshall’s mental competence.  
Marshall responded with a supplemental motion to remove 
counsel.  (ECF No. 113.)  In light of these developments, two 
issues remained to be determined by the District Court—
whether Marshall was mentally competent, and whether to 
1remove Hoey and Coggins as counsel and permit Marshall to 
proceed pro se. 
 The District Court held three hearings on these issues 
before Marshall ultimately consented to a psychiatric 




evaluation.  Dr. Francis Dattilio conducted the evaluation and 
issued a report opining that Marshall is not competent either 
to assist his counsel or to proceed pro se.  The District Court 
then held a fourth hearing on February 17, 2016.  At the 
hearing, Dr. Dattilio testified consistently with his report that 
Marshall is not competent.  The District Court then took the 
issues of Marshall’s competence and the removal of counsel 
under advisement.  In doing so, the District Court made it 
very clear at the conclusion of the hearing that it had not yet 
decided those issues: 
There are two things that need to be decided . . . 
first, whether or not Mr. Marshall is competent 
and, if not, in what ways is he not competent.  
And then, second, whether or not I’m going to 
grant his request to discharge his current 
counsel.  I will be deciding these matters sooner 
rather than later.  I’m not going to make any 
rash promises about how soon is soon, but I’m 
talking weeks, not months or years.  And when 
I do decide them, there will be a briefing 
schedule. . . . 
(ECF No. 136; N.T. 2/17/16, at 73-74.)  Marshall was present 
at the hearing.   
 Eight days later, however, and before the District 
Court had announced any decision, Marshall filed pro se the 
notice of appeal at issue here.  (ECF No. 137.)  The notice 
states in relevant part that Marshall “appeals . . . from the 
Order [of] . . . Judge James Knoll Gardner, on the date of 
February 18th, 2016, denying petitioner’s motions to remove 
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counsel and denying petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to 
proceed pro-se.  Petitioner seeks reversal of that order.”  (Id. 
at 1) (capitalization and punctuation standardized).  In fact, 
there was no such order, and Marshall’s reference to a 
February 18 order appears to be a reference to the February 
17 hearing.   
 The District Court ultimately made its decision on 
these issues and, by order entered March 24, 2016, it found 
Marshall mentally incompetent to proceed pro se and denied 
his request for removal of counsel.  (ECF No. 141.)  
Marshall’s 30-day deadline to appeal that ruling expired on 
April 25, 2016 (April 23 being a Saturday).  See Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(a)(1)(A).  Neither Marshall nor his counsel filed anything 
with the District Court or this Court by that time, and 
Marshall himself has filed nothing since.  After Marshall filed 
his notice of appeal, the Clerk notified the parties that this 
appeal would be considered for possible dismissal due to a 
jurisdictional defect and gave them an opportunity to respond.  
No party has filed a response.  
II. Analysis 
 “An appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal 
that is untimely filed, including premature appeals.”  Lazorko 
v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2000).  Marshall’s 
notice of appeal was premature because, when he filed it, the 
District Court had not yet issued or announced its decision on 
his motion for removal of counsel.  Thus, unless there is some 
basis to deem Marshall’s notice of appeal to have ripened 
now that the District Court has ruled, we must dismiss this 
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appeal as “premature and void.”  Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco 
Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 585 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 We conclude that there is no such basis and therefore 
will dismiss this appeal.  There are two ways in which 
premature appeals can ripen in this Circuit—under Rule 
4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
under the doctrine based on Cape May Greene, Inc. v. 
Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983).  See ADAPT of Phila. 
v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 433 F.3d 353, 364 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Neither applies in this situation.  Even if their requirements 
were otherwise satisfied, neither permits the ripening of an 
appeal filed before the District Court announces the decision 
sought to be challenged. 
A. Rule 4(a)(2) 
 Rule 4(a)(2) is the rule governing premature notices of 
appeal.  The rule provides that “[a] notice of appeal filed after 
the court announces a decision or order—but before the entry 
of the judgment or order—is treated as filed on the date of 
and after the entry.”  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2) (emphasis 
added).  By its terms, this rule applies only when the District 
Court actually has announced some decision or order.  See 
United States v. Cooper, 135 F.3d 960, 962 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that Rule 4(a)(2) requires an actual District Court 
“decision” and does not permit the ripening of an appeal from 
a Magistrate Judge’s recommendation);2 Williams v. Roberts, 
                                              
2 While Cooper is consistent with our Rule 4(a)(2) 
jurisprudence in its recognition that only an actual District 
Court decision triggers the rule, Cooper is in some tension 
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116 F.3d 1126, 1127 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding 
that a pro se prisoner’s appeal filed before the District Court 
announced its decision did not ripen under Rule 4(a)(2)). 
 Rule 4(a)(2) does not apply here because Marshall 
filed his notice of appeal before the District Court announced 
its decision.  The District Court announced its decision only 
later, and “not even Rule 4(a)(2) can cause a notice of appeal 
that is filed before a ruling has even been announced to 
encompass the later-announced ruling.”  16A Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3950.5 (4th 
ed. 2008); see also DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 
306, 307 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that Rule 4(a)(2) did not 
permit challenge to the final judgment on an appeal from a 
prior interlocutory order).  
 Applying the rule in this situation also would not 
comport with its purpose.  Rule 4(a)(2) is “intended to protect 
the unskilled litigant who files a notice of appeal from a 
decision that he reasonably but mistakenly believes to be a 
final judgment[.]”  FirsTier Mortg., 498 U.S. at 276.  The 
Rule does not apply when “[a] belief that . . . a decision is a 
final judgment would not be reasonable.”  Id.  In this case, it 
was not reasonable for Marshall to conclude that the District 
Court announced a final decision because the District Court 
did not announce any decision at all.  To the contrary, the 
                                                                                                     
with our Cape May Greene jurisprudence.  See Lazy Oil, 166 
F.3d at 586-87.  That tension exists because, unlike this court, 
the Fifth Circuit has concluded that FirsTier Mortgage 
abrogated its own version of the Cape May Greene doctrine.  
See id.   
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District Court expressly stated that it had not made a decision 
and would do so in the future.  Even making allowances for 
Marshall’s pro se status, this situation does not present the 
kind of trap for the unwary that Rule 4(a)(2) was designed to 
prevent. 
B.  The Cape May Greene Doctrine 
 The Cape May Greene doctrine also does not apply in 
this situation.  Under that doctrine, 
where there is no showing of prejudice by the 
adverse party and we have not taken action on 
the merits of an appeal, a premature notice of 
appeal, filed after disposition of some of the 
claims before a district court, but before entry 
of final judgment, will ripen upon the court’s 
disposal of the remaining claims. 
Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting DL Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 506 F.3d 
209, 215 (3d Cir. 2007)).  The doctrine ensures that 
“practical, not technical considerations” govern the 
determination of finality, id. (quoting Cape May Greene, 698 
F.2d at 185), and it avoids “elevat[ing] a mere technicality 
above the important substantive issues” raised by an appeal, 
id. (quoting Lazy Oil, 166 F.3d at 587). 
 In Cape May Greene, the plaintiff appealed from an 
order entering summary judgment in favor of the last 
remaining defendant.  See Cape May Greene, 698 F.2d at 
184.  The order was not final when the plaintiff filed its notice 
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of appeal because one defendant’s cross-claim against another 
defendant remained pending.  See id.  We nevertheless 
exercised jurisdiction over the District Court’s entry of 
summary judgment because the District Court later dismissed 
the cross-claim, and thus rendered final the order appealed 
from, before we took action on the appeal.  See id. at 184-85. 
 The Cape May Greene doctrine is broader than Rule 
4(a)(2) in one respect.  See ADAPT of Phila., 433 F.3d at 
363-64.  Rule 4(a)(2) permits the ripening of a notice of 
appeal from a decision that is immediately appealable if the 
District Court has announced the decision but has not yet 
formally entered it.  The Cape May Greene doctrine, by 
contrast, permits the ripening of a notice of appeal from a 
decision that is not immediately appealable but that becomes 
appealable before we take action on the appeal.   
 What both Rule 4(a)(2) and the Cape May Greene 
doctrine have in common, however, is that they permit the 
ripening only of appeals that are taken from actual District 
Court decisions.  We appear never to have made that point 
explicitly, so we take the opportunity to do so now.  In the 
absence of circumstances not presented here, the Cape May 
Greene doctrine does not permit the ripening of a notice of 
appeal filed before the District Court announces the decision 
sought to be challenged.  Instead, we have applied the 
doctrine in civil actions only to permit the ripening of appeals 
from actual decisions, and we have done so only to entertain 
challenges to those decisions themselves and not to 
subsequent rulings made after the filing of the notice of 
appeal.  See, e.g., DL Res., 506 F.3d at 214-16 (addressing 
order entering summary judgment on liability but not 
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damages); Lazy Oil, 166 F.3d at 585-87 (addressing order 
approving class settlement but not an allocation plan); Batoff 
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 & n.5 (3d Cir. 
1992) (addressing order dismissing complaint with leave to 
amend); Presinzano v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 726 F.2d 
105, 108 (3d Cir. 1984) (addressing order entering partial 
summary judgment); cf. ADAPT of Phila., 433 F.3d at 361-
65 (declining to apply Cape May Greene to interlocutory 
discovery orders).3 
                                              
3 To the extent that our decision in the administrative context 
in Khan represents an exception to this principle, it is 
distinguishable.  In that case, the petitioners filed their 
petition for review after a clerk with the Board of 
Immigration Appeals informed them on the day they were 
scheduled for removal that the Board would not consider their 
motion to reopen and emergency motion for a stay.  See 
Khan, 691 F.3d at 492.  The Board later denied their motion 
to reopen, and we permitted petitioners to challenge that 
ruling.  Id. at 492-93.  We did so by applying the Cape May 
Greene doctrine “to the circumstances presented in th[at] 
case.”  Id. at 494.  Those specific circumstances are 
instructive.  The petitioners in Khan initially sought review of 
a statement by the Board’s clerk that they understandably 
interpreted as “an effective denial of their motion.”  Id. at 
495.  Then, after the Board denied their motion on the merits, 
petitioners filed with this Court a response in opposition to 
dismissal that we construed “as updating the petition for 
review into a challenge to” that later ruling.  Id. at 494.  Thus, 
Khan involved both (1) a petition for review from the 
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 The distinguishable situation presented in Khan aside, 
we have located no authority permitting the ripening of a 
notice of appeal filed before the District Court has announced 
any decision at all.  That is for good reason.  Extending the 
Cape May Greene doctrine to this situation would permit a 
litigant to file a preemptive notice of appeal before the 
District Court makes or announces any decision and then 
proceed with the appeal if the decision later proves 
unfavorable.  Other courts have declined to sanction that 
approach.  As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “[s]ystemic 
interests in the conservation of judicial resources dictate that a 
party must not appeal an order simply because he believes it 
will be adverse.  Only where the appealing party is fully 
certain of the court’s disposition . . . will appeal be proper.”  
Cooper, 135 F.3d at 963. 
 We likewise decline to sanction that approach in this 
case, for three reasons.  First, the statute and rule governing 
                                                                                                     
functional equivalent of an actual decision and (2) the 
functional equivalent of an amended petition for review filed 
after the decision that petitioners ultimately challenged.  
There was no functional equivalent of a decision in this case 
because the District Court expressly advised Marshall that it 
had not made a decision and would do so in the future.  There 
also is no functional equivalent of an amended notice of 
appeal because Marshall did not file anything more after the 
District Court issued its decision.  We further note that Khan 
was decided on administrative review and that appellate 
Rules 3 and 4, discussed later herein, did not apply to that 
proceeding.  See Fed. R. App. P. 20. 
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the filing of the notice of appeal in this case require that it be 
filed “after” the judgment or order sought to be appealed.  28 
U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  Indeed, Rule 4 
was amended in 1979 to make that point explicit.  See Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(1) advisory committee’s notes to 1979 
amendment.  Applying the Cape May Greene doctrine in this 
situation would conflict with these provisions.   
 We have made that point in the criminal context, in 
which appellants similarly must file their notices of appeal 
“after” the judgment or order being appealed.  Fed. R. App. P. 
4(b)(1).  We adopted the Cape May Greene doctrine in that 
context to permit premature appeals, filed after a conviction 
but before the final judgment of sentence, to ripen upon entry 
of the final judgment of sentence.  See United States v. 
Hashagen, 816 F.2d 899, 905-06 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc).  In 
doing so, however, we recognized that the language of Rule 
4(b) must render certain premature appeals “inoperative.”  Id. 
at 903.  As we explained: 
There must be some limits to the circumstances 
in which a premature notice can be given effect; 
it hardly would do to permit a party to file a 
general notice of appeal at the start of the action 
as a precaution to ensure timely filing. . . .  
Indeed, the language of Rule 4(b) does not 
support the extreme prematurity of a general 
notice of appeal, for the rule requires the appeal 




Id. at 903-04 (emphasis added) (quotation marks and internal 
citation omitted).  The same principle applies in this civil 
context.  Marshall did not file a “general notice of appeal at 
the start of the action,” but he filed his notice of appeal before 
the District Court announced its decision and after the District 
Court advised him that it had not made a decision at all.   
 Second, notices of appeal must “designate the 
judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.”  Fed. R. 
App. P. 3(c)(1)(B).  Applying the Cape May Greene doctrine 
here would conflict with this rule as well.  Even when the 
Cape May Greene doctrine permits the ripening of a 
premature appeal from a decision that is not yet appealable, it 
does so only to permit review of that decision once it 
becomes appealable.  It does not permit review of subsequent 
rulings that were not (and could not have been) designated in 
the notice of appeal.  See Bonner v. Perry, 564 F.3d 424, 429-
30 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying version of the Cape May Greene 
doctrine); B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. BNSF Ry. Corp., 531 
F.3d 1282, 1296 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); see also Gov’t of 
the V.I. v. Leonard A., 922 F.2d 1141, 1146 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1991) (rejecting appellant’s “attempt[] to appeal from a 
determination and order made . . . after he filed the appeal” 
because “[t]hat issue could not possibly have been raised by 
the notice of appeal”).  A District Court’s subsequent ruling 
in this situation is not subject to review unless the appellant 
files another notice of appeal designating that ruling, and 
Marshall has filed nothing that could be construed as another 
notice of appeal in this case. 
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 Finally, even if we were at liberty to apply the Cape 
May Greene doctrine in this situation,4 we would decline to 
do so because applying it here would not be consistent with 
its purpose.  As noted above, we apply the Cape May Greene 
doctrine to avoid “elevat[ing] a mere technicality above the 
important substantive issues” raised by an appeal.  Lazy Oil, 
166 F.3d at 587.  In ADAPT of Philadelphia, we declined to 
apply the doctrine to permit the ripening of appeals from 
interlocutory discovery orders.  See 433 F.3d at 364-65.  We 
did so because applying the doctrine in that situation “would 
do more than overcome a mere technicality—it would invite 
the very piecemeal litigation discouraged by 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.”  Id. at 364. 
                                              
4 We have based our application of the Cape May Greene 
doctrine in part on Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  See Lazy Oil, 166 F.3d at 587.  That rule permits 
us to suspend the requirements of certain other rules “to 
ensure that justice is not denied on the basis of a mere 
technicality.”  Id.  As we have recognized, however, “Rule 2 
cannot be utilized to expand the jurisdiction of the Court.”  Id. 
at 587 n.9.  Giving effect to a notice of appeal filed before the 
District Court even announces the decision sought to be 
challenged arguably would do just that.  See Benn v. First 
Jud. Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2005) (“A court 
may not waive the jurisdictional requirements of Rules 3 and 
4, even for ‘good cause shown’ under Rule 2.”).  We need not 
decide that issue, however, because we would decline to 
assert jurisdiction under the Cape May Greene doctrine even 
if we had the authority to do so. 
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 There is even less of a basis to apply the Cape May 
Greene doctrine when an appellant appeals before the District 
Court has announced a decision at all.  Doing so would erode 
our “[s]ystemic interests in the conservation of judicial 
resources” by encouraging litigants to file preemptive appeals 
to challenge future rulings that may or may not prove 
unfavorable to them.  Cooper, 135 F.3d at 963.  The District 
Court ultimately denied Marshall’s motion in this case, but 
there was no basis for Marshall to file his notice of appeal 
when he did.  The District Court had not announced any 
decision at that time and instead had expressly advised 
Marshall that it would make its decision in the future.  Thus, 
Marshall filed his appeal before there was anything that he 
could bring before us for appellate review, prematurely or 
otherwise.  Marshall also knew or should have known as 
much.  Under these circumstances, the prematurity of 
Marshall’s notice of  appeal cannot be characterized as a mere 
technicality.5   
 We have described the Cape May Greene doctrine as 
taking an “expansive view of appellate jurisdiction,” and it is 
one that not all Courts of Appeals share.  ADAPT of Phila., 
                                              
5 Although Marshall’s notice of appeal brings nothing before 
us in our appellate capacity, we could construe it as a petition 
for a writ of mandamus seeking a ruling on his motion.  See 
Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998).  
There is no reason to do so because Marshall did not 
complain of any delay in ruling on his motion and, even if he 




433 F.3d at 362.  However expansive the doctrine may be, it 
does not permit the ripening of an appeal filed before the 
District Court makes or announces the decision sought to be 
challenged.  Cf. Hashagen, 816 F.2d 899 at 903-06.  Because 
the District Court had not yet announced its decision when 
Marshall filed his notice of appeal in this case, the Cape May 
Greene doctrine does not permit Marshall’s notice to ripen 
into an appeal from the District Court’s subsequent decision.  
And because Marshall did not file another notice of appeal 
after the District Court announced that decision, we lack 
jurisdiction to review it. 
III. Conclusion 
 For these reasons, we will dismiss this appeal.  We 
express no opinion on whether the District Court’s order 
denying Marshall’s motion to remove counsel remains subject 
to challenge on appeal from the District Court’s final 
judgment. 
